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PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CHARACTERISTICS
IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
RICHARD MARSHALL ABRAMS$
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM has frequently recognized
in recent years that discrimination that is based purely upon
such immutable characteristics as sex or race should be held to a
standard of judicial scrutiny which is stricter than usual.' These
types of traits may be referred to as "primary characteristics." As
legal analysis has become more sophisticated, however, questions
have arisen concerning classifications based upon traits which may
be related yet imperfectly linked to these primary characteristics. 2
These linked traits, such as pregnancy or poverty, shall be called
"secondary characteristics." The differences between primary and
secondary characteristics arise largely from the imperfect linkage
between the two: for example, not all nonpregnant people are men,
and not all poor people are black.
Occasionally a law or an employment practice which is based on
a secondary characteristic may appear to be nondiscriminatory on
its face with respect to any primary characteristic, but is nonetheless
discriminatory as applied. For example, a rule based on pregnancy
or hair length, which by its express terms applies to everyone, in
effect may be discriminatory with respect to sex. 3 If an employer or a
government deliberately discriminates on the basis of sex, the
4
primary characteristic, such action is illegal on its face. If

B.S.B.A., Bucknell University, 1969; J.D., Harvard University, 1972. Member
of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76-77 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 to -17 (West 1976); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications
and the Definition of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 451 (1975).
In most cases where such immutable characteristics are not present the usual
standard of judicial scrutiny involves an examination of whether state action or a
statutory scheme "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). If it does, there is generally no
equal protection violation. Id.
2. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy); Dripps
v. United Parcel Serv. of Pa., 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (beards); Mercer v.
North Forest Independent School Dist., 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (hair
length). See also Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro
- The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 383 (1966-67).
3. See text accompanying notes 14-25 & 33-49 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 6-11 infra.

(35)
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purposeful discrimination with respect to sex is not found, the
question then becomes whether or not the distinction based on
pregnancy or hair length, the secondary characteristic, is illegal as
applied. 5

Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 6 implicity
have suggested to the author an analytical framework for examining
allegations of "discrimination." First, it must be determined whether
the discrimination objected to is based on a primary or a secondary

characteristic. If based on a primary characteristic, under Title VII
8
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 7 it is prima facie invalid,
while under a constitutional theory the Supreme Court tends to
scrutinize the discrimination carefully.9 Second, if the discrimination
5. See text accompanying notes 6-11 infra.
6. E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 429 (1971).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
8. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....

Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
outlined the steps which must be followed to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons o f
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
9. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), rehearing
denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). In Frontiero,the plurality opinion explained its rationale
for utilizing a higher level of scrutiny when reviewing discrimination that is based on
a primary characteristic:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate
"the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility .... " And what differentiates sex from
such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with
the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual
capabilities of its individual members. ...
With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
411 U.S. at 687-88 (plurality), quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1975) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Hinds County School Bd.,
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is based upon a secondary characteristic, it is necessary to discern
whether a discriminatory effect exists with respect to the primary
characteristic. If such an effect is found to exist, under Title VII the
discrimination is prima facie unlawful. 10 Under a constitutional
theory on the other hand, the Supreme Court now requires the
plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant has manifested a
discriminatory purpose with respect to the primary characteristic."
Third, in either case involving a primary or secondary characteristic, where the discrimination is found to be prima facie unlawful
under Title VII or subject to careful scrutiny under the United States
Constitution, the invalidity may be rebutted by an appropriate
defense. Such defenses include a bona fide occupational qualification
within the meaning of section 703(e)(1) of Title VII 12 or a compelling
state interest under the United States Constitution. 3
560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977) (Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 prohibits
county from maintaining sex-segregated student assignment plan). But see, e.g.,
Vorschheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 886-88 (3d Cir. 1976) aff'd
per curiam, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977) (sex classification not subject to strict scrutiny). For a
discussion of the Vorschheimer case, see notes 183-188 and accompanying text infra.
10. E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137-40 (1976). Under Title VII,
discrimination on its face is alleged to be "disparate treatment," whereas discrimination as applied is alleged as "disparate impact." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
11. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970). This subsection provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for
an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining programs, to admit or employ any individual in any such program on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise....
Id.
13. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-92 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76-78 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944),
rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). In Korematsu, the Court held that a federal
order issued during World War II, prohibiting the petitioner and all others of
Japanese ancestry from leaving a specified area, although subject to a rigorous
standard of scrutiny because based upon a racial classification, was not unconstitutional. 323 U.S. at 223-24. The Court stated:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu
was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.
He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the
properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast
and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that
the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because
Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders - as
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This article will examine the application of this framework to
discrimination cases, with special focus on discrimination based
upon sex and race, although other types of discrimination also will
be considered. Particular emphasis will be placed on the issues
arising under the first step of this analytical framework, involving
the distinctions between primary and secondary characteristics,
because their resolution tends to depend on general legal principles,
whereas the resolution of the issues presented in the second and
third steps tends to depend more on the particular facts of the case.
II.

SEX DISCRIMINATION

A. Pregnancy as a Sex-Linked Characteristic
In recent cases involving discrimination based upon sex it
appears that the United States Supreme Court usually has taken
care to distinguish between primary and secondary characteristics
in achieving its results. The Supreme Court, in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,4 held that an employer could exclude pregnancy related
disabilities from its disability income protection plan 15 without
violating the sex discrimination provision of Title VII.16 The Court
relied heavily on its prior decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 17 in which a
similar disability program was held not to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8
The General Electric Court utilized an analysis which was
essentially similar to the first two steps of the implicit analytic
inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power to do just this.
There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight - now say that at that
time these actions were unjustified.
Id.
14. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
15. Id. at 136-40.
16. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). For the text of this subsection, see note
8 supra.
17. 429 U.S. at 133-40. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
18. 417 U.S. at 494. The Geduldig Court had noted:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the
program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of
the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program.
There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.
Id. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted). See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 46 U.S.L.W. 2112,
2113 (D.S.C. July 27, 1977) (school board's refusal to renew pregnant teacher's
contract, based on foreseeable period of absence, violated neither Title VII nor
fourteenth amendment). See also Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 496
(7th Cir. 1977) (employer's no-spouse rule held valid under Title VII); Women in City
Gov't United v. City of New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 2200, 2200 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1977) (proof
of disparate impact resulting from employer's exclusion of pregnancy related
disabilities from disability plan did not violate Title VII).
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framework set forth above. 19 Under the first step, it determined that
the discrimination in disability benefits was not based on sex, but on
pregnancy. 20 Moreover, it stated that a division between women and
men was not congruent with a division between pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. 21 In other words, the Court concluded that
the discrimination was not based on sex, but on a sex-linked, or
secondary, 22 characteristic. 23 Proceeding to the second step, the
Court held that the distinction did not have a discriminatory effect:
The "package" going to relevant identifiable groups we are
presently concerned with - General Electric's male and female
employees - covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is
facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that "[t]here is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are
not."

24

However, there are really two aspects of equality - equality of
inclusion and equality of exclusion. The above quotation indicates
that there is equality of inclusion in the plan. That is, the plan
covers precisely the same risks for both men and women. There is
not equality of exclusion, however - women are subject to an
uncovered risk which men are not - pregnancy disability. In other

See text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
429 U.S. at 136.
Id. at 135-36. The Court's distinction between the two types of classifications
follows:
"The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes."
Id. at 135, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
22. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
23. 429 U.S. at 135-36; see Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C.
1977); United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa. April 11, 1977).
Many state courts faced with a similar issue have overlooked this distinction. See
Board of Educ. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360
N.Y.S.2d 887, aff'g, 42 App. Div. 2d 854, 854-55, 346 N.T.S.2d 843, 844 (1974) (denial of
sick and sabbatical leave for pregnancy held unlawful); Board of Educ. of Union Free
School Dist. No. 2 v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E.2d
202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974), aff'g 42 App. Div. 2d 49, 53, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93, 98 (1973)
(mandatory maternity leave invalidated); Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York
State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 378-79, 320 N.E.2d 859, 862, 362
N.Y.S.2d 139, 143-44 (1974) (program providing special treatment for pregnant
persons in determining date for return to employment disallowed); Cerra v. East
Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973) (school board
regulation for mandatory maternity leave invalidated as sexually discriminatory);
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 198-99, 517 P.2d 599, 602 (1974) (denial of
unemployment compensation to pregnant women overturned).
24. 429 U.S. at 138, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
19.
20.
21.
was as

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 35

words, the plan is underinclusive. The Court resolved this problem
by stating:
As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more-to
men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based
discriminatory effect in this scheme simply because women
disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is
to say, gender-based discrimination does not result simply
because an employer's disability benefits plan is less than all
inclusive. For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities
constitute an additionalrisk, unique to women, and the failure to
compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed
parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which
results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. To hold
otherwise would endanger the commonsense notion that an
employer who has no disability benefits program at all does not
violate Title VII even though the "underinclusion" of risks,
impacts, as a result of pregnancy-related disabilities, more
heavily upon one gender than upon the other. Just as there is no
facial gender-based discrimination in that case, so, too, there is
25
none here.
Thus, the Court's reasoning can be summarized in terms of the
analytical framework as follows: 1) the program is sexually neutral
on its face because it discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, not
sex; 2) the program is sexually neutral as applied because of the
evenhanded inclusion of risks for both men and women; and 3) the
Court did not need to reach the third step in order to hold the
program valid because the program did not achieve a discriminatory
effect with respect to sex.
B. Hair as a Sex-Linked Characteristic
Pregnancy is not the only sex-linked characteristic to provide
the basis for disparate treatment. Facial hair was considered
recently in two cases by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. In Dripps v. United ParcelService
of Pennsylvania,Inc.,26 an employer's rule prohibiting welders from
wearing beards was upheld in the face of a Title VII challenge. 27 The
court observed:
[P]laintiff was not subject to any sex discrimination by virtue of
being required to shave his beard. Indeed the defendant's rule
25. 429 U.S. at 138-40 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
26. 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974), a/ld, 515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1975).
27. 381 F. Supp. at 421-22.
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forbidding welders from wearing beards is a sound, bona fide
occupational qualification based on reasonable concern for
safety. The Court discerns neither an intent to discriminate nor
discrimination in fact. While it is true that only men can grow
beards, it does not follow
that a rule prohibitingbeards amounts
28
to sex discrimination.
Similarly, in Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School District,29 a suit
brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,3 the
district court used particularly colorful language in upholding a
school regulation prohibiting male students from wearing beards or
moustaches. 31 The court held, however, that the regulation did not
32
apply to the plaintiff since his moustache was de minimis.
Obviously, just as pregnancy can occur only among women, so
too a non-de minimis growth of facial hair can occur only among
men. Nevertheless, discrimination based on these traits is not
discrimination based on sex, but on sex-linked physical characteristics. Accordingly, the facial hair cases are consistent with the
pregnancy cases.
Both of these types of cases, however, are in conflict with those
involving long head hair on men largely because there is no attempt
to distinguish between primary and secondary characteristics in the
latter cases. One such case, decided by the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, was Mercer v. Board of Trustees.33 The suit was brought
challenging the constitutionality of a public school hair length
regulation which applied only to male students. 34 Mercer is unique
because it was brought under what is commonly termed the Equal
28. Id. at 421, citing Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316

(S.D. Fla. 1972) (emphasis added).
29. 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

Id.
31. 310 F. Supp. at 584-88. The court's analysis in Lovelace lacked any discussion
of sex discrimination;

it focused

upon first amendment rights of freedom of

expression. Id. The absence of a consideration of the sex classification appears to
indicate that although the class of persons affected by the regulation consisted

entirely of male persons, this fact in and of itself did not constitute sex discrimination.
32. Id. at 588. The court stated: "His mustache is de minimis and practically
imperceptible. It is merely a natural growth, not a cultivated adornment. We do not
believe that plaintiff has violated the code. To exclude him from school for such a non-

violation is arbitrary, and a violation of due process." Id. (citations omitted).
33. 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).

34. Id. at 202.
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Rights Amendment (ERA) contained in the Constitution of the State
of Texas, 35 and seems to be the only suit in any jurisdiction in which
hair length regulations were challenged under an ERA. As the court
observed:
[T]he present claim is based on a provision of the Texas
Constitution that is not contained in the United States
Constitution. Federal courts have dealt with hair-length claims
based on the first amendment, ninth amendment, equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment,
and the right of privacy, but we have found no such claim,
federal or state, that has ever been based on an ERA. Therefore,
the
appellants' claim must stand or fall on an interpretation of
36
ERA contained in the constitution of the State of Texas.
The court then decided that, under the State ERA, sex is a "suspect
classification. '3 7 Accordingly, the court stated:
Any such classification must fall unless the party defending it
can show that it is required by (1) physical characteristics, (2)
other constitutionally protected rights such as the right of
privacy, or (3) other "compelling reasons." With respect to
"physical characteristics" we are simply recognizing the facts of
life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile
as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights
to deny sexual or
established by it require us to construe it so 3as
8
reproductive differences between the sexes.
Based on this analysis, and on the fact that "[1]iving by rules,
sometimes seemingly arbitrary ones, is the lot of children, '39 the
40
court sustained the hair length regulation.
It is clear, however, that long hair is not one of the "physical
characteristics" which differentiates men and women. Both men and
women can and sometimes do have long hair. It is certainly not a
sex-linked physical characteristic, like pregnancy or non-de minimis
facial hair, which can only occur in one sex. Rather it is a sex-linked
social characteristic. Some would argue that it is exactly this type of
social stereotyping that should be invalidated, and it appears that

35. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. Section 3a provides: "Equality under the law shall not
be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This
amendment is self-operative." Id.
36. 538 S.W.2d at 203 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 206.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 206-07.
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this was the viewpoint of a United States district court in Florida. In
Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc.,4 1 a Title VII
case, a Florida district court had before it a suit involving male
employees who alleged that they were discharged wrongfully from
work, because of their beards and moustaches on the one hand, and
because of their refusal to cut their hair on the other. 42 Although the
complaints involving only beards and moustaches were dismissed as
not involving unlawful sex discrimination, 43 those alleging employment discharges based on hair length were sustained. 44 The court
held:
The recent set of opinions concerning school hair length
regulations illustrate the difficulty of the determination involved
in a constitutional right context. . . . No such difficulty exists
here, since the dismissal of long haired males can obviously be
equated to "refusing to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes." A preference for short-haired
male employees is such a stereotyped characterization....
Therefore the complaint states a valid claim for violation of Title
VII by alleging discharge based on hair length. 45
Although the Mercer case 46 is similar to the facial hair 47 and
pregnancy cases, 48 in that it upheld the challenged regulations, the
Mercer case incorrectly upheld discrimination based on sex, but
allegedly justified its holding by basing it on physical characteristics. The facial hair and pregnancy cases correctly upheld discrimination based on physical characteristicsdirectly, utilizing a similar
type of reasoning to that employed in Rafford:
The discharge of pregnant women or bearded men does not
violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply because only women
become pregnant and only men grow beards. In neither instance
are similarly situated persons of the opposite sex favored. These
cases are perhaps more properly considered under the rubric...
that discrimination between different categories of the same sex
is not unlawful discrimination by sex. This is a case of

41. 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
42. Id. at 318.
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 319.
45. Id., quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 274 (1976).
46. See notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
48. See notes 14-25 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 35

discrimination in favor of men who shave off their beards and
49
moustaches. It does not involve proscribed sex discrimination.
C. Other Sex-Linked Characteristics
Other areas involving some aspect of sex distinctions may be
appropriately handled with the same kind of neutrality as the courts
used in General Electric5° and Rafford.5 1 For example, abortion laws
are not sexually discriminatory, although they may infringe other
rights which are not pertinent to the present discussion. 52 Similarly,
laws regarding .prostitution or rape can be put into a sexually
neutral form, such as one who sells sexual services to another, or one
who has forcible sexual intercourse with another. 53 Therefore, laws
along these lines are also sexually nondiscriminatory. Under the
same reasoning, discrimination based on marital status is not
discrimination based on sex.5 4 The distinction drawn here in reality
is between married persons and single or divorced persons, not
55
between men and women, and thus is permissible.
The distinction between maternity and paternity presents a
more difficult problem. If the distinction is based solely on biology,
49. 348 F. Supp. at 320 (citation omitted). See notes 19-25 & 28 and accompanying
text supra. See also note 31 supra.
50. For a discussion of General Electric, see notes 14-25 and accompanying text
supra.
51. For a discussion of Rafford, see notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
52. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See also Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977); Beal
v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977). Analogously, the same may be said with regard to
pregnancy regulations. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).
53. Two Pennsylvania statutes, for example, utilize this approach. In PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 18, §5902(a) (Purdon 1973), a sexually neutral phraseology is used: "A
person is guilty of prostitution ...

if he or she. .

. ."

Id. (emphasis added). Similarly,

the Pennsylvania Statutory Rules of Construction state the "[w]ords used in the
masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1902 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976).
54. See Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 189 (1976) (statutory scheme upheld
whereby married woman whose husband retires or becomes disabled is entitled to
Social Security benefits but a divorced woman whose former husband retires or
becomes disabled is not entitled to those benefits); Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544
F.2d 892, 893-94 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 548 F.2d 356 (1977) (employer's rule
prohibiting flight attendants from marrying during employment held not to be sex
discrimination in spite of the fact that all flight attendants were female). See also
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
55. In Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), rehearingdenied, 548
F.2d 356 (1977), the court explained the distinction:
[P]laintiff is not a member of one of the relevant, identifiable classes which has
been discountenanced in favor of another such class. Rather, certain women stewardesses who are unmarried - are favored over certain other women. As one
of the all-female group of flight attendants employed by Delta, plaintiff suffered
a discrimination, but it was based on marriage and not sex. Men were not
favored over women ....

544 F.2d at 893. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
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then, conceptually, it should be treated no differently than one based
on pregnancy. It is not based on sex, but rather on physical sexlinked, or secondary characteristics. Thus, inheritance statutes
which treat an illegitimate child as the child of the mother but not of
the father 56 are presumably based on biology and how it affects the
ability to prove lineage. 57 Theoretically, therefore, they are not
examples of sex discrimination.5 8 If, however, the distinction is not
based on biology, but rather on preconceived roles of childrearing,
then it is an impermissible discrimination, which the Supreme Court
has held to be unlawful. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,59 a
woman was informed by a corporation with which she sought
employment that her application would not be accepted because she
was the mother of preschool age children. 60 Despite this attitude, the
corporation did employ men with such children. 61 In this Title VII
suit brought by the woman, the Supreme Court reversed the
summary judgment granted in favor of the corporation and
suggested that on remand the possible existence of a justification for
the distinction under the bona fide occupational qualification section
of Title

V1162

be considered. 63 Justice Marshall in his concurrence

responded:
I fear that . . .the Court has fallen into the trap of assuming

that the Act [Title VII] permits ancient canards about the proper
role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress,
however, sought just the opposite result.
By adding the prohibition against job discrimination based
on sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act Congress intended to prevent
employers from refusing "to hire an individual based on

56. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976). That
subsection provides: "For purposes of descent by, from and through a person born out
of wedlock, he shall be considered the child of his mother but not of his father." Id.
57. The justification for this type of inheritance statute was expressly recognized
by the Supreme Court recently in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), but the
statute was held violative of the fourteenth amendment because, inter alia,it excluded
categories of illegitimate children whose inheritance rights could be recognized
without jeopardizing the orderly method of property disposition - that is, where
paternity was readily determinable. Id. at 772, 776. See note 56 supra.
58. It should be noted, however, that cases involving inheritance statutes of this
nature do not focus on the rights of the parents but rather on those of the illegitimate
children. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971), noted in Petrillo, Illegitimacy, Inheritanceand the 14th Amendment, 75 DICK.
L. REV. 377 (1971).
59. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
60. Id. at 543.
61. Id.
62. See note 12 supra.
63. 400 U.S. at 544.
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stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." Even characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve
as predicates for restricting employment opportunity. 64
D. Discussion of Sex-Linked Characteristics
It should be repeated at this point that the present focus is on
the first step of the implicit analytic framework - whether or not the
practice in question is sexually neutral on its face 65 - not with the
66
second - whether or not the practice is sexually neutral as applied.
That is, we are not dealing with the question of whether a nonsexual
discrimination has a sexually discriminatory effect, because such a
question usually turns on the facts of a particular case rather than
on general legal principles.
The analysis in step one may be understood more easily by
eliminating sexual references altogether. For example, the pregnancy cases can be interpreted as allowing behavior which draws
distinctions between pregnant people and nonpregnant people.
Similarly, the facial hair cases can be seen as allowing prohibitions
against any person wearing facial hair. However, the long hair cases
cannot be analyzed within this framework, since the prohibitions
there are not against any person wearing long hair, but only against
men wearing long hair.67 Accordingly, it is submitted that these
cases improperly allow discrimination based on sex. Similarly, use of
characteristics such as height and weight are inherently sexually
neutral on their face, but may have a sexually discriminatory effect
or may be a subterfuge for sexual discrimination. 68 The same also

may be true of suits involving life expectancy. 69 In all such cases,
64. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted), quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1970). For the current version of the regulations cited by Mr. Justice
Marshall, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1976).
65. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
67. See notes 38 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
68. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1977) (height and weight

requirements for prison guards established prima facie violation of Title VII); Smith v.
Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1975) (minimum weight requirement for police
officers held sexually discriminatory); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98, 100
(W.D. Kan. 1973) (minimum weight requirement for production line workers held
discriminatory in practice). See generally 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 170 (1976).
69. See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 553 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1976),
rehearing denied, 553 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 197), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3184 (Oct. 3,
1977) (employer's requirement that female employees contribute 15% more to
retirement plan than males because of longer life expectancy violates Title VII); Reilly
v. Robertson, 360 N.E.2d 171, 177-79 (Ind. 1977) (separate actuarial tables for male
and female retired teachers for computation of benefits paid violates equal protection
clause). But see EEOC v. Colby College, 46 U.S.L.W. 2253 (D. Maine Oct. 27, 1977)
(pension plan requiring employees to contribute equally but paying different benefits

to male and female does not violate Title VII).
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any classification should be made by the particular characteristic at
issue and not by sex. This approach would provide uniform
treatment not only for those characteristics which are unique to one
sex, such as pregnancy and facial hair, but also for those
characteristics which are average to only one sex but possessed by
both, such as greater height, weight, strength, or life expectancy. Sex
per se should not be the issue in any of these cases. As was stated in
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (P.I.A.A.), 70 a case involving interscholastic athletic competition
71
under the Pennsylvania ERA:
The notion that girls as a whole are weaker and thus more
injury-prone, if they compete with boys, especially in contact
sports, cannot justify the By-Law in light of the ERA. Nor can
we consider the argument that boys are generally more skilled.
The existence of certain characteristicsto a greaterdegree in one
sex does not justify classification by sex rather than by the
72
particularcharacteristic.
The relationship between discrimination on the basis of such
physical characteristics and sex discrimination was considered in a
Yale Law Journal article 73 on the proposed federal ERA. 74 That
article stated:
The fundamental legal principle underlying the Equal
Rights Amendment, then, is that the law must deal with
particular attributes of individuals, not with a classification
based on the broad and impermissible attribute of sex. This
principle, however, does not preclude legislation (or other official
action) which regulates, takes into account, or otherwise deals
with a physical characteristic unique to one sex. In this situation
it might be said that, in a certain sense, the individual obtains a
benefit or is subject to a restriction because he or she belongs to
one or the other sex. Thus a law relating to wet nurses would
cover only women, and a law regulating the donation of sperm
70. 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
71. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
72. 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 52, 334 A.2d at 843 (emphasis added). Accord, Brenden
v. Independent School Dist. 742, 342 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd 477
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (school athletic teams). Contra, United States v. Yingling,
368 F. Supp. 379, 386 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (in selective service context, greater average
strength of males held a "distinguishing and distinctive physical characteristic"). See

also Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 664 (1975); Comment, Sex Discriminationin Athletics, 21
VILL. L. REV. 876 (1976).

73. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Brown].
74. 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (presently before the states for ratification).
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would restrict only men. Legislation of this kind does not,
however, deny equal rights to the other sex. So long as the law
deals only with a characteristic found in all (or some) women but
no men, or in all (or some) men but no women, it does not ignore
individual characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an
average based on one sex. Hence such legislation does not,
without more, violate the basic principle of the Equal Rights
Amendment.
This subsidiary principle is limited to physical characteristics and does not extend to psychological, social or other
characteristics of the sexes. The reason is that, so far as appears,
it is only physical characteristics which can be said with any
75
assurance to be unique to one sex.

As previously discussed, distinctions on the basis of traits which are
unique to one sex are permissible.76 Moreover, even those based on
physical characteristics that are not unique to one sex may be
permitted under certain circumstances, such as on the basis of bona
fide occupational qualifications within the meaning of section
703(e)(1) of Title VII. 77 Yet the point of the above-quoted passage
from the Yale article, as well as that made by the Florida district
court in Rafford,78 take this concept even further: only women can
become pregnant and only men can grow beards, but not all women
can become pregnant and not all men can grow beards; therefore,
discrimination based on these traits is not discrimination based on
sex.
This viewpoint, however, is not necessarily the most popular one
to hold. One comment writer 79 has noted that the Yale article has
been widely discussed in congressional debates concerning the
federal ERA.80 That author observed that the Yale article has been
particularly advanced as support for the proposition that classifications based upon characteristics unique to one sex would not, even
under the ERA, raise an issue of sex discrimination. 81 In the
comment author's view, such an interpretation seemed to evidence
congressional support for the Supreme Court's definition of sex

75.
76.
77.
supra.
78.

Brown, supra note 73 at 893 (emphasis in original).
See notes 14-32 and accompanying text supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970). For the text of this subsection, see note 12
See text accompanying note 49 supra.

79. Comment, supra note 1.
80. Id. at 473, citing S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
81. Comment, supra note 1, at 473, citing S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1972).
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discrimination in Geduldig v. Aiello.82 She criticized this proposition
and the Yale article's support of it in the following language:
Opponents [of the ERA] were not entirely convinced that
legislation providing special benefits to one sex on account of a
unique sex trait would survive ...
S.. In the first place, the matter of unfavorable treatment of
a socially beneficial function like childbearing was not before
Congress. . . .Because its attention was focused on preserving
beneficial legislation, there is no evidence that Congress really
considered the negative implications of excluding single-sex
characteristics from its equal rights formulation. In fact, the
Senate report on the E.R.A. dismissed the entire subject in a
single cursory sentence: "the Amendment will not invalidate
laws which punish rape, for such laws are designed to protect
women in a way that they are uniformly distinct from men."
Since the E.R.A. was clearly remedial, it is unlikely that
Congress would intentionally approve a rationale that could
then be utilized to achieve exactly what the E.R.A. was designed
to end: distinctions harmful to a protected class.8 3
It is clear that this comment writer has little desire to achieve
true equality. In using such language as "special benefits to one
sex", "beneficial legislation", "protect women", and "protected
class", she makes it clear that she only desires equality to the extent
that it does not conflict with women's existing vested benefits and
protections. This concept is reiminiscent of the famous quote from
George Orwell's Animal Farm: 4 "All animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others."8 5 The comment writer
manifestly wishes to have women maintain their protected, pedestal
status under the law, while at the same time achieve independence
where desired or convenient.
Indeed, there is even some judicial support for this type of oneway equality. In Kahn v. Shevin,8 6 the Supreme Court sustained a
Florida law8 7 which gives widows, but not widowers, an annual $500

82. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See Comment, supra note 1, at 473. For a discussion of
Geduldig, and the Supreme Court's reliance on that case in GeneralElectric,see notes
17-18 and accompanying text supra.

83. Comment, supra note 1, 473-74, quoting S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
84. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (New Am. Lib. 1946).

85. Id. at 123.
86. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
87. Id. at 355-56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (West Supp. 1974-75).
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property tax exemption.8 8 Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,8 9 the

Court upheld a system of military promotion 90 which provides for
mandatory discharge of male naval officers who fail to be promoted
after nine years of active service, while the same rule is applied to
female officers only after thirteen years. 91 In spite of the fact that
Kahn and Ballard apparently upheld distinctions based purely on

sex, the above Comment writer, in discussing the two cases, referred
to "[t]he Court's acceptance of these inequitable means of achieving
undeniably admirable goals of compensation"

as "not entirely

satisfactory. ' 9 2 Her mild criticism of these cases sanctioning sex
discrimination in favor of women is in sharp contrast to her
relentless attack of cases which she feels condone sex discrimination
against women. 93 Although this disparity is consistent with her
notions of the desirability of "special benefits to one sex" and
88. 416 U.S. at 355-56. After noting the existence of "overt discrimination or...
the socialization process of a male-dominated culture" so that "the job market is
inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs," id. at 353, the Court
stated:
We deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy
of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that
loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. We have long held that "[w]here
taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection,
is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing
lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation."
Id. at 355, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1972).
89. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
90. Id. at 510. See 10 U.S.C. §§6382(a) & 6401(a) (1970).
91. 419 U.S. at 510. In expressing its rationale, the Court remarked:
[T]he different treatment of men and women naval officers under §§ 6382 and
6401 . . .reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the
demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service. Appellee
has not challenged the current restrictions on women officers' participation in
combat and in most sea duty. Specifically, "women may not be assigned to duty
in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to
duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and transports." ... Thus
in competing for promotion, female lieutenants will not generally have compiled
records of seagoing service comparable to those of male lieutenants. In enacting
and retaining §6401, Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that
women line officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male
counterparts, and that a longer period of tenure for women officers would,
therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women officers with "fair and
equitable career advancement programs."
Id. at 508, quoting 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970) (emphasis in original).
92. Comment, supra note 1, at 452.
93. Two cases which the comment writer strongly criticized in her article were
Geduldig and General Electric. Id. at 476-78. For example, she stated:
It is ... stereotyped thinking that produced the [Geduldig v.] Aiello decision
and its casual ignoring of the ties which society has fashioned out of biology to
bind women to their "proper place." Yet, ironically, it is the Supreme Court
which has become in the recent decades of this century the organ of American
government most sensitive to those stereotypes which penalize citizens for
characteristics - like birthplace, skin color, or indeed, gender - which they can
neither choose nor change. Both the tradition of the Court and the dictates of
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treating women as a "protected class", 94 it is precisely this kind of
hypocrisy which discredits the movement toward true equality of the
sexes.
Accordingly, it would seem that the Yale article 95 and the
Pennsylvania court in P.I.A.A. 96 were correct to discard the criterion
of sex altogether and instead to rely on individual physical criteria
directly. As stated previously in this article, sexual references can
and should be eliminated, so that distinctions are drawn between
"persons" in one category and "persons" in another. 97 Thus, the
General Electric case was decided properly, in that it drew a
98
distinction between pregnant persons and nonpregnant persons.
Although these formulations may appear to be somewhat artificial
in some instances, they tend to ensure that the final result is
sexually neutral on its face.
Notwithstanding where a court may actually draw lines in a
given situation, it seems clear at this point that it has been
recognized that characteristics such as pregnancy, facial hair,
height, weight, strength, life expectancy, and marital status are
correlated only imperfectly with sex; and therefore, certain distinctions based on these traits may be logically permitted. Distinctions
based on these characteristics are based on secondary characteristics, not on primary characteristics.9 9 The United States Supreme
Court has made this important point the first step of its analysis in
its recent decisions in the field of sex discrimination. However, it has
not always done so when dealing with cases involving race
discrimination.
III. RACE DISCRIMINATION
A. Poverty as a Race-Linked Characteristic
Analogous to the dichotomy between sex and sex-linked
characteristics is the distinction between race and race-linked
empirical observation, therefore, plead strongly for a reexamination
assumptions which underlie [Geduldig v.] Aiello.

of the

The experience of the [General Electric] plaintiff is extreme, but it is not
unique. And even where a woman is not entirely reliant on her own income, there
is still no reason to deny her full benefits for her disabilities when full coverage is
offered to men. To disqualify her from benefits because she can "plan" for this
necessary unemployment time, presumably by relying on her husband's income,
assumes that most women are not primarily "breadwinners" and reinforces the
stereotype of female dependency.
Id. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
94. Comment, supra note "1, at 476-78.
95. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
98. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976). For a discussion of
this point in General Electric, see text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
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characteristics. One commonly litigated trait that is race-linked is
poverty. 1 0 Courts in their analysis in this area generally have held
that, under the Constitution, discrimination based on economics is
not discrimination based on race and thus may be allowed. For
example, in James v. Valtierra,10 the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to an amendment to the California Constitution which
provides that no low-rent housing project be constructed or acquired
by a state public body until that project is approved by a majority of
the voters of the community.10 2 Plaintiffs, who were eligible for lowcost housing, challenged this referendum requirement on equal
protection grounds, 0 3 and the Court upheld the amendment. 04
Two lower court Title VII cases, however, Wallace v. Debron
Corp.10 5 and Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America,0 6 illustrate the
manner in which the proposed analytical framework can be used in
the context of Title VII to reach the opposite conclusion in the area
of economic discrimination, while maintaining a well-reasoned
approach. Both cases involved black employees who were discharged
from their jobs because their wages were garnished more frequently
than permitted by the employers' rules. 0 7 Relying on the Supreme
Court's holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 108 these cases held that
the rules were discriminatory against blacks, 0 9 utilizing what, upon
100. See S. MASTERS, BLACK-WHITE INCOME DIFFERENTIALS (1975); L. THUROW,
POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION (1969).
101. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
102. Id. at 139-40 & n.2, quoting CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
103. 402 U.S. at 139.
104. Id. at 143-44. In sustaining the procedure, the Court stated:
[A] lawmaking procedure that "disadvantages" a particular group does not
always deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a state
would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were
required on all, because they would always disadvantage some group ....
Furthermore, an examination of California law reveals that persons
advocating low-income housing have not been singled out for mandatory
referendums while no other group must face that obstacle.
Id. at 143. Accord, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th
Cir. 1975); Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir.), rehearingdenied, 517
F.2d 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975), noted in 88 HARV. L. REV. 1631
(1975). See also McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 928-29 (5th
Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Arlington Heights, see notes 125-30 and accompanying
text infra.
105. 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
106. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971), noted in 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1972).
107. 494 F.2d at 674-75; 332 F. Supp. at 492.
108. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See 494 F.2d at 675-76; 332 F. Supp. at 493-95. In Griggs,
black employees asserted that requiring that certain job applicants possess a high
school diploma and pass an intelligence test constituted a Title VII violation. 401 U.S.
at 426-28. In holding that the requirements were unlawful under Title VII, the Court
remarked: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
109. 494 F.2d at 677; 332 F. Supp. at 494.
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close observation, appears to be an analysis in line with the threestep framework posited herein.
As a first step, it was recognized that the employers' rules did
not constitute discrimination based on race' 1 ° - that is, that the
employer's policy was not based on a primary characteristic.
Proceeding to the second stage of analysis, the courts observed that
the rules did have a discriminatory effect with respect to race."' In
the words of the Johnson court:
A survey of the available information on wage garnishment
reveals that minority group members suffer wage garnishments
substantially more often than others, i.e., the proportion of racial
minorities among the group of people who have had their wages
garnisheed [sic] is significantly higher than the proportion of
racial minorities in the general population.
The fact that blacks and other racial minorities are so often
subject to garnishment action is related to the fact that they are
to a disproportionate extent from the lower social and economic
segments of our society. Approximately three times the proportion of blacks as compared to whites are in the lower end of the2
economic scale, due in large measure to racial discrimination."1
The third step in terms of the framework was the rejection by both
courts of the defenses that the rules were justified by a showing of
3
"business necessity."
More recently, the Supreme Court handed down holdings in
Washington v. Davis" 4 and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp."15 which clearly differentiated between claims of racial discrimination under the United
States Constitution against governments" 16 and those under Title
110. 494 F.2d at 675; 332 F. Supp. at 494. The Johnson court noted that "plaintiff
does not contend that defendant adopted the rule for the purpose of discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, or that the rule was applied in a racially
discriminatory manner." Id. at 494.
111. 494 F.2d at 676; 332 F. Supp. at 494.
112. 332 F. Supp. at 494 (citations omitted). But see Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514
F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1975).
113. 494 F.2d at 677; 332 F. Supp. at 495. Commenting on the business necessity
defense, the Johnson court stated that:
The exact boundaries and contours of the phrase "business necessity" are
still uncertain. The court, in Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v.
United States, . . . stated that the policy or practice must be "essential to the
safe and efficient operation" of the business. In Griggs, the Court stated that a
permissible practice must be one which can be shown to be "related to job
performance" or "measuring job capability."
Id. at 495, quoting Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
115. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
116. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
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VII against private employers. 117 The Court held that constitutional
claims, but not Title VII cases, required proof of discriminatory
18
purpose.'
Washington v. Davis involved a constitutional challenge to a
qualifying examination which tested the written and oral communication skills of candidates for the Washington, D.C. Police Force. 119
Under the first step of its analysis, the Court determined that the
examination did not discriminate by race, but by literacy.' 20 Under
the second step, it was held that even if the test did have a
"differential racial effect,' 2' the facts as presented did not "warrant
the conclusion that it is a purposeful device to discriminate against

Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional rights of
respondents as well as other black applicants."' 122 Accordingly, the
23
qualification examination was upheld.
Arlington Heights, involving a zoning ordinance which prohibited multiple-family housing, 24 was more directly an economic
discrimination case. A refusal of the local planning commission to
rezone the area in question in order to allow construction of low-

income housing

was challenged as unconstitutional. 1 25 After

observing that the refusal was not racially discriminatory on its

face,

26

the Court concluded that it did have a racially discrimina-

tory impact on blacks. 27 Nevertheless, a racially discriminatory
purpose, required for liability in its prior Washington v. Davis

117. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 268-71 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976).
118. 426 U.S. at 246-48.
119. Id. at 234-35.
120. Id. at 245-46. The Court stated that "the relationship of the test to the
training program negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the
basis of race or that 'a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than
ability."' Id. at 246, quoting Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1972).
121. 426 U.S. at 246.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 248. Of course, because the Court found the test to be constitutional,
there was no need to reach the third step of the analytical framework.
124. See 429 U.S. at 257.
125. Id. at 254-57. The refusal to rezone was also asserted to be a violation of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 429 U.S. at 254.
126. 429 U.S. at 269.
127. Id. The Court noted the importance of a discriminatory effect when it stated:
The impact of the official action - whether it "bears more heavily on one race
than another" - may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare ....
[Ilmpact
alone is not determinative ....
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976).
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holding, 128 was found to be lacking, 129 and the refusal to rezone the
property was held valid under the Constitution.' 30
Both Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights demonstrate
the distinction that must be made under the analytical framework
between cases brought under Title VII and those under the
Constitution - that a discriminatory purpose with respect to the
primary characteristic must be shown under the latter, but not under
the former. As was noted in Washington v. Davis:
Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring and
promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate
numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need
not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to
demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices ....
However this process proceeds, it involves a more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly
responsible acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact,
without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed
to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of
applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in cases such
13 1
as this.
This differentiation between constitutional claims and those
under Title VII did not have to be made by the General Electric
Court because that case involved only allegations of Title VII
violations. 132 Moreover, the Court did not pass the second step of the
framework because it found that no discriminatory effect was
present. 33 When the Court determined that discrimination based on
the secondary characteristic, pregnancy, had no discriminatory
effect with respect to sex, the analysis needed to proceed no further.
B.

Other Race-Linked Characteristics

In most instances, skin color is treated as a primary characteristic, so that distinctions made on that basis are likely to be held
unlawful. 3 4 However, it is also possible to view color as a secondary

128. See text accompanying note 122 supra.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

429 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 271.
426 U.S. at 247-48.
429 U.S. at 127-28. See notes 14-25 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). For the text of this subsection, see

note 8 supra.
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characteristic, in light of the fact that not all persons who possess a
dark complexion belong to the Negro race, nor vice versa. 135 As was
stated by one commentator:
True, it is not obvious that all racial classifications are
constitutionally improper. Though the principle that the
Constitution is color-blind is an easily stated and applied one, it
may be that the broader terms of the equal protection clause
allow a color line to be drawn by the state under certain
circumstances. For instance, a state might well be permitted to
provide that anyone whose skin is darker than a certain shade
(either attached as an exhibit or defined in terms of albedo or
reflecting power) is negligent for walking on a road at night
without wearing some light-colored item of clothing. This,
however, is a very different type of classification from that
contemplated in preference (or segregation) laws. Not only will
some whom we define as non-Negro be included in the darkskinned category and some Negroes excluded, but even more
important, the classification appears to be made for a reasonable
purpose to which color -

as distinguished from race -

is

directly relevant. So, too, it is conceivable that some future
scientific discovery may show that in certain genes attached to
what we consider Negroid characteristics are associated with
specific diseases. Perhaps then a vaccination could be required
of all those who appeared to have the relevant characteristics.
Whether the state could then require a vaccination of all Negroes
- on the theory that this social fact is an easily adminsterable
and roughly accurate guide to the need for the medical treatment
136
is another question indeed.
Another race-linked characteristic which is treated as a primary
characteristic under Title VII1 37 is ethnicity or national origin. Thus,
discrimination based on national origin is not discrimination based
on race. According to the recent district court case of Budinsky v.
Corning Glass Works, 38 a complaint brought under section 1981 of

135. See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro -

The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363 (1966).

136. Id. at 383 (footnotes omitted). See Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d
1283, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977) (employer's requirement that employees have strong backs
did not violate Title VII even where employee's discharge was due to bone
degeneration from sickle cell anemia, a disease only occurring in blacks).
137. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). For the text of this subsection, see note 8
supra. It should be noted that §703(a)(1) of Title VII specifically prohibits
discrimination on the basis of national origin; whereas an express prohibition of
classifications on the basis of pregnancy or poverty is not provided. See note 8 supra.
138. 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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the Civil Rights Act of 1870139 may not lie for a claim alleging
140
employment discrimination based entirely on national origin.
While recognizing that some groups emanating from certain general
geographic areas may be the victims of group discrimination, which
4
for section 1981 purposes may be termed "racial discrimination",' '
the court distinguished the suit before it:
The same cannot be said with regard to persons of Slavic or
Italian or Jewish origin. These groups are not so commonly
identified as "races" nor so frequently subject to that "racial"
discrimination which is the specific and exclusive target of
§ 1981. Members of these groups ... do not properly fall within
142
the coverage of the statute.
Similarly, in United States v. Antelope, 143 the Supreme Court held
that a federal criminal statute 44 which applies solely to members of
a certain Indian tribe did not amount to unconstitutional discrimination against members of the Indian race; rather, it constituted a
permissible classification of an Indian tribe.145 Relying upon an
historical analysis, 146 the Court noted than an Indian tribe is a
separate ethnic group with its own political institutions, and that
special treatment based on these factors does not constitute racial
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white

citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Id.
140. 425 F. Supp. at 788-89. The plaintiff alleged that, based solely on his Slavic
national origin, he was not promoted or given an increase in salary in a manner
comparable to his fellow employees, he was required to accept unreasonable duties,
and he was finally discharged from his job. Id. at 786.
141. Id. at 788. The court made particular reference to such groups as Hispanic
persons and Indians. Id. On the issue of discrimination against Indians, see contra,
notes 143-47 and accompanying text infra.
142. 425 F. Supp. at 788.
143. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
144. Major Crimes Act of 1948, § 1153, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
145. 430 U.S. at 646-47.
146. Id. at 645. The Court stated:
The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation with
respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based on
impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, classifications expressly
singling out Indian tribes as subject of legislation are expressly provided for in
the Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal
Government's relations with Indians.
Id. (footnote omitted), citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. It is interesting to note the
different attitude expressed in the dictum of the district court in Budinsky, wherein
Indians were expressly referred to as one of those groups which could be subject to
racial discrimination for purposes of a § 1981 suit. See note 141 supra.
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discrimination.' 4 7 Thus, both Budinsky and Antelope appear to have
distinguished between racial discrimination and distinctions predicated upon the secondary characteristic of national origin or
ethnicity. Because of this difference, the decisions rationally
concluded that the alleged behavior was lawful.
148
Locality of residence is another race-linked characteristic.
While there is a general tendency for certain races to live in certain
areas, they do not invariably do so. Therefore, discrimination based
on locality is not necessarily discrimination based on race.
Geographical discrimination occurs in the practice of "redlining,"
which is the denial of home loans or financial assistance on the
1 49
basis of the locality of the home.
In Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co.,150 an Ohio federal
district court, in a suit brought under various sections of the Civil
Rights Acts of 196415' and 1968152 for alleged redlining on the basis
of race, 1 53 denied the defendant-lender's motion for summary
judgment. 5 4 In its discussion of the various statutory arguments,
the court interpreted each section of the statutes in issue to prohibit
redlining if it is based on the racial composition of the communities
55
involved, rather than on the actual economic conditions.
Although the court did not do so, this case may be examined in
terms of the three-step analytical framework. The first step is to note
that redlining is not discrimination based on race, but on a racelinked characteristic - locality. The second step is to determine
whether or not there is a discriminatory impact with respect to race,
as was alleged in Laufman. 56 If a discriminatory effect is found, the
147. 430 U.S. at 646-47.
148. See generally Ryan, Banking Law - Redlining, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AMER. L.

57.
149. Id. at 57-58. One commentator has observed:
Simply defined, the term "redlining" denotes the decision by mortgage
lenders to deny loans on all properties located in specific geographical areas that
are presumably outlined in red on the lenders' maps ....
The outright denial of
mortgage money to particular sections of a city is no longer the common practice.
Today mortgage lenders make loans in redlined neighborhoods, but often only at
terms substantially less favorable than those in other areas. Although more
subtle than outright denial, this imposition of stricter terms leads to a similar
result.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
150. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See 408 F. Supp. at 491.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605 (1970) (amended 1974); id. § 3617 (1970). See 408 F.
Supp. at 491.
153. 408 F. Supp. at 491.
154. Id. at 501.
155. Id. at 493, 498-99.
156. Id. at 499. The court noted that: "Plaintiffs complain that the conduct of
defendants 'excluded [plaintiffs] from participation in' and 'denied [plaintiffs] the
benefits of ... [a] program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,' .
Id.
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third step is to determine whether or not there is a special
justification for the redlining.
The defendants in Laufman argued that such a justification
existed in the form of a federal regulation' 57 which authorizes that
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, prior to insuring a lender,
conduct an appraisal of real estate pledged as security for bank
loans.'5 8 The defendants maintained that the statement in Paragraph (g) of this regulation that one of the purposes of the appraisal
is to determine whether the neighborhood is declining' 5

9

actually

meant: "[W]atch out about loaning in neighborhoods where the
neighborhood is declining, where the area, the homes are declining.'' 16 The court rejected defendants' justification and concluded
that the regulation meant that the lender might refuse to grant a
loan where the neighborhood is in fact declining, in the exercise of
sound business judgment. 16 1 However, according to the court, the
regulation did not mean that lenders could consider the racial
composition of the neighborhood as determinative of whether the
neighborhood was actually deteriorating. 162 In other words, a lender
may decide to grant a loan, or not, based on the economics of the
neighborhood, but not the race.
This dictum in Laufman is interesting to consider in light of the
economic discrimination cases, such as Arlington Heights.'63 The
holding in Arlington Heights would appear to allow a lender to
discriminate on the basis of economics, so long as there is no
indication that there is any intent to discriminate on the basis of
race. 64 Moreover, even if a discriminatory effect on those of a
certain race is shown, no constitutional violation will be found
unless the impact is so substantial as to compel an inevitable
157. 12 C.F.R.

§ 571.1(a)(1) (1917).

158. 408 F. Supp. at 500, citing 12 C.F.R. § 571.1 (1977). The Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, under the direction of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, insures the accounts of all federal savings and loan associations, as well as the
accounts of other building and loan, savings and loan, and homestead associations
which are eligible for insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.4 (1977).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 571.1(g) (1977). The paragraph provides in pertinent part:
The Chief Examiner may obtain the services of a professional appraiser to
make actual, physical appraisal of specific properties, . . . or to make a
preliminary appraisal or survey. The latter procedure is to estimate the highest
and best use of the property, to select the approach which, in his opinion, will
develop the most rational value indication, to ascertain whether the neighborhood is improving, stabilizing or declining, to determine the condition of the
property, etc.

Id.
160. 408 F. Supp. at 500, quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17.
161. 408 F. Supp. at 501, quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-30.

162. 408 F. Supp. at 501, quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-30.
163. See notes 125-130 supra.
164. See 429 U.S. at 270-71.
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inference of purpose. 1 65 Thus, Laufman appears to be consistent with
the constitutional economic discrimination cases in this respect.
Unfortunately, not all cases fit as neatly into the proposed
analytical framework as Laufman. There is often some confusion
between discrimination based on race and discrimination based on
race-linked characteristics, which creates difficulty in applying steps
one and two of the framework. This confusion, in turn, may cause
errors in analyzing claims of discrimination which would culminate
in unsatisfactory precedent. This was precisely what occurred in the
landmark case of Loving v. Virginia,166 where laws forbidding
miscegenation were struck down under an equal protection and due
67
process analysis.1
It appears that the Loving Court reached the right result for the
wrong reason. In Loving, a black woman and a white man pled
guilty to a charge of violating Virginia's statutory ban on interracial
marriages. 168 Subsequently, they instituted a suit against the state to
have the antimiscegenation statutes declared unconstitutional and
to enjoin enforcement of their convictions. 169 The state primarily
argued that there was no equal protection violation because the
statutes were applied equally to white and blacks - an "equal
application" theory. 170 Without adequate explanation, the Court
rejected this theory on the ground that "[t]here can be no question
but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinc' 71
tions according to race."'
It appears that the Court, in terms of the analytical framework,
confused the first two steps of the analysis. In fact, there was no
racial discrimination, for the statute necessarily applied to both
races equally. There was, on the other hand, a discriminatory effect
with respect to race, mandating a finding of unconstitutionality if a
172
discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the extensive effect.
Moreover, even if the effect were not sufficient to support an
inference of purpose, the Court could have used an analysis
involving freedom of association and marriage, as well as the right
of privacy, as has been utilized in other decisions, 73 to invalidate
statutes.
165. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
166. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
167. Id. at 12.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 8, 10.
171. Id. at 11.
172. See text accompanying note 122 supra. See also text accompanying notes 129
& 130 supra.
173. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Under the Court's analysis, however, the precedent provided by
this decision could lead to some interesting problems. As previously
stated, discrimination based on marital status is not discrimination
based on sex. 174 It was suggested during the Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings on the federal ERA in September, 1970175 that,
"[i]f the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is
toward race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between
members of the same sex would be as invalid as laws forbidding
miscegenation.' 1 76 If the ERA is ratified by the states, it seems that
the analysis of Loving would mandate the invalidity of statutes
outlawing wedlock between members of the same sex. However, the
application of the analytical framework set forth in this article
would not require this result. Rather, the Court would be able to
consider the issue in terms of right to privacy and freedom of
association, 177 and, in analyzing society's overall needs, might find
such statutes to be valid.
7
Similar problems arise with the "separate but equal" doctrine.1 8
Although for a number of years it was considered legally viable, the
doctrine was finally held to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of
Pducation.179 However, because the Court did not utilize an analysis
in Brown which differentiated between racial discrimination and a
discriminatory effect with respect to race - steps one and two of the
proposed framework, respectively - the decision tends to confuse the
area. Like Loving, Brown did not concern, strictly speaking,
discrimination based on race, since both races were separately
equal.'80 It did, however, concern a doctrine which had a discriminatory effect with respect to race. As the Court stated:
To separate them [children in elementary and high schools] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
174. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
175. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciaryof the United States Senate
on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231, Proposingan Amendment to the Constitutionof the
United States Relative to Equal Rights for Men and Women, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
74-75 (1970) (statement of Paul A. Freund) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/z: Eq 2/6/9 70-2).
176. Id. at 74-75. But see M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 83, 355 A.2d 204, 207-08
(1976) (lawful marriage must be between persons of opposite sex).
177. A freedon of association analysis would seem to be as appropriate in this area
as in the Loving type of situation, because it involves sexual preference rather than
sex, just as Loving involved racial preference, rather than race. See note 197 and
accompanying text infra.
178. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
179. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
180. Id. at 492. The Court stated that "there are findings below that the Negro and
white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible'
factors." Id.
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race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone ....
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group."''1
It would seem that a finding of discriminatory purpose could easily
be inferred from the finding of the tremendous impact noted in the
above quote; therefore, even under Washington v. Davis and
82
Arlington Heights,1
the same result could have been reached
through the use of the analytical framework.
However, since the Brown court failed to distinguish between
racial discrimination and a discriminatory effect, the recent decision
of Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphial8 3 may arguably
be inconsistent with the logic of Brown. Theoretically, if Brown is to
serve as precedent for the proposition that the "separate but equal"
doctrine violates the equal protection clause because it constitutes
racial discrimination, then there should also be a finding of sex
discrimination when single-sex schools are under scrutiny. In
Vorchheimer, however, the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of single-sex schools in Philadelphia.18 4 The court reasoned that the
female plaintiff's desire to attend an all male school was not rooted
in the Brown "feeling of inferiority,"'18 5 but rather upon "her desire
to have an expanded freedom of choice."'1 8 That is, there was no
discriminatory effect with respect to sex. 8 7 The holding also may be
explained on the ground that sex is not a suspect classification like
race, although the court did state that something stronger than the
rational relationship test was to be used - the "'fair and substantial
relationship"' test. 8 8 If this type of analysis were applied consist181. Id. at 494, quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1953)

(district court finding).
182. See notes 114-31 and accompanying text supra.
183. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 430
U.S. 703 (1977).
184. 532 F.2d at 888.
185. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
186. 532 F.2d at 888. Contra, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d

619 (5th Cir. 1977).

187. The court noted a trial court finding that: "[t]he court's factual finding that
Girls [school] and Central [the male school] are academically and functionally
equivalent establishes that the plaintiff's desire to attend Central is based on personal
preference rather than being founded on an objective evaluation." Id. at 882. See
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 400 F. Supp. 326, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

188. 532 F.2d at 886.
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ently, the fears that equality of the sexes would prohibit separate
lavatory facilities clearly would be totally unfounded. 189 "Separate
but equal" is not discrimination per se; the question is whether it has
a discriminatory effect.
Thus, to avoid the type of confusion exhibited in older cases like
Loving and Brown, it is important that the Supreme Court continue
to follow a three step analysis. This analytical framework distinguishes between discrimination based on race and discrimination
based on race-linked characteristics - such as poverty or literacy which has a discriminatory effect with respect to race. This
approach, in turn, would lead to more persuasive, logical results.
IV.

OTHER TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION

A.

Religion

As have been demonstrated, discrimination based on certain
primary and secondary characteristics can be analyzed in terms of
the three-step framework presented in this article. However, the
analysis does not lend itself to use in certain other types of cases,
such as those involving discrimination based on religion.
Clearly there is a difference between discrimination based on
religion under the establishment clause of the first amendment1 90
and the right to religious freedom under the free exercise clause of
that amendment. 191 It initially appears that, conceptually, the
former is more analogous to the analysis used in cases involving
violations of the fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due
process and equal protection than it is to the latter, which deals with
the right to religious liberty. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in
Welsh v. United States,192 certain kinds of religious discrimination
1 93
require an "equal protection" mode of analysis.
Actually, however, religious discrimination is not usually
analyzed in terms of due process or equal protection, but in terms of
the establishment clause of the first amendment. 94 Any kind of
discrimination creates two classes - a disadvantaged group and an
189. See 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 168 (1976).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment 6f religion ....
" Id.
191. Id. The free exercise clause states: "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .... ." Id.

192. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
193. Id. at 356-58 (Harlan, J., concurring).

194. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
825 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). See generally Comment, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and
Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1974).
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advantaged one. Religious discrimination not only violates the
disadvantaged class's right to equal protection, but also prefers the
advantaged class in violation of the establishment clause. It is
actually only the latter violation which is emphasized. For example,
the Supreme Court, in Fowler v. Rhode Island,195 set aside the
conviction of a group of Jehovah's Witnesses for using a park that
was open to all other religious faiths, stating: "[A] religious service
of Jehovah's Witnesses is treated differently than a religious service
of other sects. That amounts to the state preferring some religious
1 96
groups over this one."'
This focus upon the establishment clause is very possibly
attributable to the fact that religion does not fit neatly into a
primary or secondary characteristic category because it is not a
characteristic at all; rather, it is a persuasion, a practice of beliefs, a
type of conduct. Religion is more like creed and politics than like
race, more like sexual preference than sex. 197 Therefore, it is not
merely historical accident that there are special provisions for
religious freedom placed together with the other rights protected by
the first amendment; such freedom is conceptually intertwined with
other freedoms of expression and association. As the Supreme Court
198
once stated: "All are interwoven there together."
Attempts to treat religion as a characteristic rather than a
persuasion tend to lead to confusion and conflict. For example,
section 703 of Title VII 199 prohibits discrimination based on
religion." However, subsection 2(7) of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972201 amended section 701 of Title VII by
inserting a definition of the term "religion,"' 20 2 which apparently
195. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).

196. Id. at 69.
197. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (E.D. Pa.
1974) ("Bluntly, blackness and homosexuality are not the same phenomenon."). Of

course, there are certain mixed categories which are combinations of both a
characteristic and a persuasion. For example, the Black Muslims are members of both
a race - characteristic - and a religion - persuasion. Similarly, Jews are actually
an ethnic group - characteristic - as well as members of a religion - persuasion.
When such mixed categories occur, and the "characteristic" half of the category is a
primary characteristic, then the "persuasion" half of the category may be treated as a
secondary characteristic for purposes of preventing discrimination.
198. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
199. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
200. Id. For the pertinent portion of the text of § 703, see note 8 supra.See generally
Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 580 (1975).
201. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V
1975)).

202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). This subsection provides: "The term
'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
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requires employers to "reasonably accommodate" their employees'
religious practices. 20 3 Since section 2(7) is a law affecting the
establishment of religion and is not totally neutral, the federal courts
are split over whether or not this amendment violates the
20 4
establishment clause of the first amendment.
20 5
Although it is clear that discrimination based upon sex,
race, 20 6 or age 20 7 can properly be proscribed by the legal requirement
that employers reasonably accommodate their practices to their
employees, it is not so clear that this accommodation requirement
may lawfully be applied to discrimination based on religion. The
reason for this conceptual dichotomy lies in the fact that the first
type of accommodation would result in the same treatment for
everyone, whereas religious accommodation necessarily creates
different treatment for persons of different religious beliefs. Nevertheless, some courts have gone so far as to hold that the uniform
application of certain work rules and practices places impermissibly
unequal burdens on employees of different religions, mandating
accommodation for the unevenness. 20 8 This result may be justified,
however, through the observation that sex, race, and age are
characteristics,which should not be considered by an employer,
whereas religion is a practice of beliefs, which should be considered.
B. Political Beliefs
Discrimination based on political persuasion is closely allied to
the religion analysis since it is also governed by the first
203. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (airline
not required to accommodate employee whose religious beliefs did not permit
Saturday labor); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D.
Pa. 1975) (employer did not reasonably accommodate employee whose religion
prevented work on Saturday, where employee had offered to work on Sundays and
holidays at regular pay).
204. Compare Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (C.D.
Cal. 1977) (subsection 2(7) violates Establishment Clause) with Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 554 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S.
65 (1976) (subsection 2(7) does not violate Establishment Clause).
205. See, e.g., [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 6137 (Case No. YAT9-409, February 19,
1970) (employer violated Title VII where only excuse for refusal to hire females was
that he would have to undergo expenses to build separate comfort facilities); 15 AM.
JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 168 (1976).
206. See, e.g., [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 6039 (Case No. YME9-068, May 28, 1969)
(removal of racial designations from restrooms insufficient to comply with Title VII;
employer had to take appropriate steps to prevent whites from harassing blacks who
attempted to use previously white restrooms); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 145 (1976).
207. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally 15 AM. JuR. 2d Civil Rights §§ 226-242 (1976).
208. See, e.g., Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1972); Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 689-90 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in
pertinent part, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir.), rehearingdenied, 525 F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1975).
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 580,608 (1975); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 197
(1976).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

23: p. 35

amendment. However, unlike religion, political belief is not covered
by Title VII nor by any other federal statute, therefore, purely
private political discrimination is not proscribed by federal law.20 9
The 1976 Supreme Court case of Elrod v. Burns2 10 involved a
challenge by non-civil service employees of the Cook County, Illinois
Sheriffs Office to their dismissal. 211 The employees alleged that the
sole reason for the discharges was that they were not members of the
same political party as the newly elected sheriff. 2 12 In holding that

the employees stated a valid claim for relief, 2 13 the Court utilized a
freedom of political association approach, 214 balancing the first
amendment rights involved against the various justifications for
political patronage proposed by the government. 2 15 The Court found
2 16
the balance to favor the employees' first amendment interests.
2
17
In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., (Richmond), where a
private, nongovernmental employer was involved, 218 the Fourth
Circuit reached a different result.2' 9 The plaintiff asserted that he

had been dismissed from his job solely because of his membership in
the Ku Klux Klan. 220 The court declined to hear plaintiffs case,

however, noting the absence of any form of state action on the part
of the defendant-employer, which the court asserted was necessary
to raise a first amendment challenge. 221 Despite the unavailability of
a federal constitutional remedy, some courts have held that state
statutes prohibiting political discrimination may be validly applied
222
to prohibit this type of conduct.

209. See notes 217-21 and accompanying text infra.

210. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
211. Id. at 350.
212. Id. at 351.
213. Id. at 373.
214. Id. at 355-60.
215. Id. at 360-73.
216. Id.
217. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
218. Id. at 505.
219. Id. at 505, 507.
220. Id. at 505.
221. Id. at 506-07. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 742 (1957). See generally 15 AM. JUR. 2d
Civil Rights §§ 243-44 (1976).
222. See Santiago v. People of Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946)
(conviction of employer under Puerto Rican statute prohibiting employer from
discrimination against employees upheld where employer had discharged employee
because of political affiliation); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 484-87, 171 P.2d 21, 24-25 (1946) (statute prohibiting
employer from engaging in political discrimination against employees upheld);
Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 639, 217 N.W. 412, 413-414 (1928) (statute
applied to prohibit employers' attempts to influence employees' votes by threatening
wage reduction); 15 AM. JuR. 2d Civil Rights § 245 (1976).
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CONCLUSION .

Regardless of the legality in any particular situation of
discrimination by religion, political affiliation, or sexual preference,2 2 3 it is clear that these types of discrimination are based on
what people do. This type of "behavior" discrimination is conceptually quite different from discrimination by sex, race, or age, which is
based on what people are. Herein lies the distinction between the
two. The analytical framework proposed by this article is intended to
apply only to characteristics, not practices of beliefs, because various
policy and morality judgments come into play when there is an
element of choice in an individual's course of action which
constitutes his "behavior." These policy considerations make
uniform rules of application very difficult, if not impossible, to
formulate.
However, there is no element of choice with immutable
characteristics such as sex, race, or national origin. Accordingly, in
cases involving discrimination based on such primary characteristics, or on the secondary characteristics related to them, an
analytical framework such as the one proposed is not only possible;
it is imperative if Supreme Court decisions are to be based upon any
sort of logical, unbiased reasoning. With the use of a unified
analysis, perhaps lower courts in their numerous attempts to wrestle
with cases involving discrimination will have a more coherent
approach to follow. The Supreme Court appears to have followed the
proposed three-step analytical framework in its recent cases
involving sex and race discrimination and hopefully not only will
continue to do so, but will expand its application to claims of
discrimination based on other primary characteristics as well.
223. See notes 166-177, 190-208 & 209-222 and accompanying text supra. See also
Ancafora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 246 (1976).
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